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This article presents a novel account of a key concept in John Dewey’s 
reconstructionist theory specifically related to the nucleus underlying his 
idea of democracy: intersubjective communication, what Dewey called 
the “democratic criterion.” Many theorists relate democracy to a form of 
rule. Consequently, discussions of democracy tend to be limited to func-
tionalist theories. Dewey’s idea of democracy establishes an important 
distinction from conventional theories by developing its radical, critical, 
evolutionary, and intersubjective potential. I argue that Dewey anticipated 
Jürgen Habermas’s Paradigm of Communication in his reconstructionist 
social theory with potential to de-reify institutions and to empower human 
beings democratically.
Of unparalleled importance in John Dewey’s democratic philosophy is his focus on 
the process of change, or the “continuous reconstruction of experience.”1 But how 
is change to take place and under what circumstances does it best occur? What are 
the ramifications of Dewey’s theory of change and reconstruction on representa-
tive government and political rule? Is change expected to occur pragmatically as a 
planned process, or is change understood as inchoate phenomena occurring spo-
radically in Dewey’s philosophy? Who determines change and the degree to which 
it shall take place? Why does Dewey prioritize democratic communication over 
other forms of communication?
Dewey clearly connects his philosophy of change and reconstruction to gov-
ernance, but he develops an ontological basis for change that subsumes more than 
mere political rule. For Dewey, change and reconstruction are such fundamental parts 
of human experience that he represents them as part of a biological and evolution-
ary process of human adaptation to social and natural environments. Change and 
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reconstruction encompass all forms of life, not just politics, and because he perceives 
change in this way, he links the process of change with a deeply moral attribute of 
human existence, namely, democracy and communication. Since we all experience 
change naturally, Dewey develops a democratic moral theory of how social change 
should take place. Therefore, Dewey ruptures traditional political theories that view 
democracy purely as a form of governance, “as a system of command and obedience,” 
as Markell asserts, which “risk[s] sacrificing the spirit of insubordination that ani-
mates . . . change, interruption, openness, and novelty.”2 Dewey’s philosophy elevates 
democratic change and social reconstruction, making them the background against 
which politics (and other spheres of social existence) are measured. In other words, 
the substance of social practices, economic activities, and political rule are assessed by 
the extent to which they adhere to the moral expectations of democratic experience. 
The other key component in Dewey’s philosophy of change and reconstruc-
tion is communication, also an experience that must adhere to democratic prin-
ciples in reaching consensus in a social order. Furthermore, the moral value of 
democratic communication is that it changes the participants involved in interac-
tion. Again, Dewey conceives of this democratic process as an evolutionary means 
of social adaptation and transformation. For example, in Democracy and Educa-
tion he asserts that the experience of communication “requires” the participants 
“to formulate” perspectives that are “not their own,” to understand something “as 
another would see it.” This is a process, he asserts, wherein participants “assimilate, 
imaginatively, something of another’s experience.” Moreover, it is virtuous because 
it contributes to actualizing “what one is capable of becoming through association 
with others in all the offices of life.”3 Growth requires penetrating the confines of 
custom and habit. The fundamental importance of communication and change 
or reconstruction are summarized by Dewey in terms of his “democratic ideal:” 
The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signi-
fies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common 
interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests 
as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interac-
tion between social groups . . . but change in social habit—its continuous 
readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied 
intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the demo-
cratically constituted society.4 (Emphasis added)
Dewey’s focus on change, democracy, and communication anticipates Jürgen 
Habermas’s communication paradigm. In what follows, I analyze and compare 
Dewey’s and Habermas’s analysis of the moral and democratic (qua Dewey) dimen-
sions of communication, and the intersubjective normative basis (qua Habermas) 
that both theorists develop. Dewey offers a distinctive philosophy of democratic 
communication that appears to have informed Habermas and contributed to the 
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latter’s construction of an equally elaborate moral basis for social order. I attempt 
to explicate Dewey’s theory of democratic communication and how it anticipates 
the moral basis of Habermas’s contemporary communicative action theory, which 
is grounded in intersubjectivity. Both Dewey and Habermas emphasize the follow-
ing elements in their underlying theories, which are listed in Figure 1. Change or 
reconstruction serves as a necessary expectation of any critical theory intended to 
advance or emancipate individuals from systems of power. Democratic experience 
contributes to growth or actualization through communication, the latter of which 
is a fundamentally natural means of experiencing the other elements.
Indeed, the degree of change permitted during any specified time, epoch, or 
place, whether social, political, economic or religious, remains circumscribed by 
existing cultural parameters and the extent to which these parameters are penetra-
ble. Cultural limitations, for example, delimit the framework for acceptable debate 
and discourse, which include defining the participants who can enter into com-
munication, the extent to which cultural and mystical traditions may be critiqued, 
and the presence or absence of expert, authoritative, or privileged “validity claims.” 
Additional considerations include the extent to which institutional structures either 
facilitate or obstruct participation, and the degree to which existing cultural knowl-
edge is capable of distinguishing between what Habermas refers to as “the objective, 
social, and subjective worlds,” and the extent to which rationalities are differentiated 
as “propositional truth, normative rightness, [and] subjective truthfulness,” accord-
ing to Habermas. In addition, “cultural tradition must permit a reflective relation 
to itself” to allow for critique, and “action-oriented . . . success . . . freed from the 
imperatives of an understanding that is to be communicatively renewed.”5 
Likewise, Dewey asserts that readjustments to our understanding depend upon 
the extent to which education can “modify mental and moral attitudes” that have 
become static. What is necessary, according to Dewey, is “an educational reforma-
tion” that stimulates “thoroughgoing change in social life.”6 The process of education, 
which includes recurring intersubjective critiques of the status quo in order to actual-
ize desired change, is as instinctive, Dewey believed, as one’s adaptation to an altering 
natural environment. Habituation is also a natural human inclination. We settle into 
new surroundings through a process of readjustment and adaptation, and what was 
once new becomes familiar and commonplace. “This enduring adjustment,” accord-
ing to Dewey, “supplies the background upon which are made specific adjustments, 
as occasion arises.”7 Likewise, in criticizing Talcott Parson’s social theory, Habermas 
addresses the fundamental importance of this background knowledge in develop-
ing his own communication theory. According to Habermas, it is “the interpretive 
accomplishments of participants in interaction, which make consensus possible [and] 
central to the concept of social order.” It is through the “language-dependent pro-
cesses of reaching understanding, he argues, [that] take place against the background 
of an intersubjectively shared tradition, especially of values accepted in common.”8 
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Long before Habermas published his magnum opus on communicative 
action, Dewey concluded that humanity had yet to understand the significance of, 
and the potential benefits that could be generated by, socializing and systematizing 
democratic communication. More recent scholarship focusing on Dewey’s com-
munication theory, often referred to as the “neopragmatic interpretation of Dewey 
. . .” or “the pragmatic renaissance,” views Dewey “as an advocate of education as 
communication,” according to Englund. From this perspective, one that I share, 
“education is just one aspect of a democratic form of social life that is communi-
cative.”9 Education, like democracy, is overwhelmingly part of complex human 
experiences and therefore cannot be reduced solely to formal schooling, although 
it is the latter that rightfully takes center stage in Dewey’s philosophical agenda.
Too often, Dewey asserted, “Men . . . want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs 
fixed by authority, to relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility 
of directing their activity by thought.” Paraphrasing John Stuart Mill, Dewey con-
cluded that traditional schooling, for example, was “better adapted . . . to mak[ing] 
disciples than inquirers.”10 Dewey refers to “the ideal of a continuous reconstruction 
. . . of experience,” which derives its “meaning or social content” by augmenting 
“the capacity of individuals to act as directive guardians of this reorganization,” 
otherwise known as his “democratic criterion.”11 Acknowledging the “risks” that 
are often present during inquiry, only by increasing the number of individuals 
who take part in communicatively reconstructing society, “a widening of the area 
of vision through a growth of social sympathies,” Dewey argued, “does thinking 
develop to include what lies beyond our direct interests: a fact of great significance 
for education.”12 Adhering to custom is a rational human response, according to 
Dewey, for it provides a settled and fixed foundation upon which to subsist, but 
he viewed parochialism and conventionality as “rigid” and too mechanical, thus 
inhibiting mankind’s potential for progressive change. “By its very nature, a state 
is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for,”13 according to 
Dewey, but we too often reify social institutions by our “passive acquiescence . . . 
and a minimum of active control.”14 Habermas refers to this as a process of system 
integration that has been decoupled from the lifeworld.15 
Inquiry and critique of the status quo, the fundamentals of scientific investiga-
tions, are bold endeavors that Dewey sought to socialize in order to “dissolve” out-
dated, routinized, or prohibitive “custom[s].” Dewey’s “democratic ideal” requires 
“the recognition of mutual interests,” which can only take place through intersub-
jective communication, and it must always be amenable to change or “continuous 
readjustment.”16 In Democracy and Education, for example, Dewey recognizes the 
value, in fact the necessity, of intersubjective (democratic) discourse when he claims 
that “competing philosophies” must come together for the practical purpose of 
reaching agreement. Diverse social, economic, and political groups often view their 
environments differently and sometimes in conflicting ways, and it is necessary, 
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he argues, to make possible the dialectical and democratic deliberations that can 
respond to emerging conflicts, broaden cultural horizons, and renew thinking.17 
Recognizing the state as a fallible human construction, Dewey concluded that, 
“Almost as soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be re-made.”18 History provides 
proof of this, according to Dewey, in that as much as we try to achieve a utopia, 
it is impossible to construct a perfect state once and for all. There will always be 
unforeseen problems, even in a state that has been studiously predetermined by 
its founders. The ideal preconceived polity will always fall short of its conception, 
which is why “the formation of states must be” viewed as “an experimental process” 
and dependent upon continuous reconstruction through shared communication. 
Put differently, “The State must always be rediscovered,” he declared.19 
Dewey disliked institutional inertness, and, like Habermas, he believed the 
state should not determine social relationships, but that social relationships should 
be organized in ways that facilitate intersubjective communication and potentials 
for progressive change. “The belief in political fixity,” he declared, “of the sanctity of 
some form of state consecrated by the efforts of our fathers and hallowed by tradi-
tion, is one of the stumbling blocks in the way of orderly and directed change,” and 
“it is an invitation to revolt and revolution.”20 Likewise, Habermas viewed systems 
as “forming one system or discourse, which steer[s] communications . . . described 
in a language that objectivistically disregards actors’ self-understanding.”21 The 
State forms an important aspect of our environment, political and otherwise, and 
Dewey sought means to ensure the constant social adaptation to changing condi-
tions and to enable citizens to hold systems accountable to a public will formed by 
intersubjective communication. States are merely reconstructions of what used to be 
considered new or novel. The seeds of change may be dormant for a time, but they 
eventually germinate into a new form. Political revolutions inform change, but the 
institutions that emerge after the dust has settled should be prevented from concret-
izing social relationships that simply regenerate a new “objective reason manifested 
in the [new] state.”22 Building upon Immanuel Kant’s Pedagogics, “creative effort” is 
facilitated when “men consciously strive . . . to educate their successors not for the 
existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a future better humanity.” Oth-
erwise, systems of education become mere conduits used to functionally reinforce 
the existing state of affairs, similar to the goals of “social efficiency.”23 
Dewey’s concern about the problem of freezing social institutions after the 
establishment of a state is shared by Sheldon Wolin. For example, Wolin asks what 
might be considered a Deweyan question: “If democracy is rooted in revolution, what 
of democracy is suppressed by a constitution?” In other words, according to Wolin, 
“When a democratic revolution leads to a constitution, does that mark the fulfill-
ment of democracy, or the beginning of its attenuation?”24 Of course, the answer to 
this question depends on the constitution and the extent to which it facilitates demo-
cratic participation and communication. Dewey was critical of contemporary politics 
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because, as he put it, “the Public seems to be lost;” that “popular imagination can con-
ceive of no other way by which . . . governmental affairs [may be] carried on than by 
the façade of representative government,” which often serves as a veneer to perpetuate 
the interests of a few.25 “A society which makes provision for participation in its good 
of all its members on equal terms,” according to Dewey, “and which secures flexible 
readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated 
life is in so far democratic.”26 Bynum appears to agree, contending that “Dewey’s anti-
essentialist assertion that society exists ‘in transmission, in communication,’ develops 
from an account of ‘life’ that opens Democracy and Education and forms the philo-
sophical basis for Dewey’s conception of society and education.”27 The lingering prob-
lem, which Dewey acknowledges, is that the American founding was not an attempt 
at democracy. Rather, the founding resulted in a constitution that separated, through 
a number of checks and balances, democratic accountability while contributing to a 
system, in Habermasian terms, which mostly took on a life of its own distinct from 
popular control. The problem of reifying political and social institutions can best be 
understood through Dewey’s view of the American and French Revolutions. 
looking back to tHE amErican and frEncH rEvolutions: 
undErstanding dEwEy’s criticisms of tHE EnligHtEnmEnt
During the American and French Revolutions emotional claims and diatribes were 
devoted to the subject of regime change and the transformation of older systems or 
systems that had gone astray. The more radical perspective was expounded by indi-
viduals like Thomas Paine, who believed that the revolutions symbolized legitimate 
breaks from the dead weight of tradition once reflective conditions cultivated the 
possibility to reconstruct inherited practices. New powerful critiques of Britain’s and 
France’s monarchical regimes, founded on “Superstition” and “Power,” according 
to Paine, justified their overthrow and the substitution of new institutions based 
on enlightened reason to promote the common good. Believing the British gov-
ernment to be rotten to the core, Paine argued for supplanting it root and branch. 
“All hereditary government is in its nature tyranny,” Paine demurred.28 The more 
conservative Edmond Burke, on the other hand, who believed that many of Brit-
ain’s and France’s cultural traditions were worth saving, believed that generational 
change must be gradual, pragmatic, respectful of existing institutions, and lawful. 
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke quotes from Euripides’s Tele-
phus, “Spartam nactus es; hanc exorna” (Your lot is cast in Sparta, be a credit to 
it). Burke’s point was that a citizen must “make the most of the existing materials 
of his country” by balancing his “disposition to preserve” that which is beneficial 
with “an ability to improve” upon existing defects.29 
Burke and Paine helped define the parameters of debate and possibilities for 
change during the late eighteenth century, with Burke viewing the body politic as a 
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naturally evolving organism that is historically conditioned and relatively stable, and 
Paine shifting the emphasis from a pragmatic position to radically questioning the 
very premises upon which British representative government stood regardless of its 
duration. Both men saw value in change, but Burke admired tradition and prudence 
as much as Paine sought extrication from history by seeking revolutionary change 
and rebirth.30 While Burke may have been too deferential to traditional authority and 
Paine too bombastic in developing a predetermined state of affairs, neither focused 
on the value of political arrangements that could enable an intersubjective and nor-
matively based process of frequent renewal. Dewey recognized this shortcoming.
Dewey was critical of many Enlightenment thinkers beyond Paine and Burke, 
including Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Adam Smith, all of whom were overly commit-
ted to establishing predetermined blueprints for ideal political arrangements. Dewey 
criticized Locke’s foundationalism, for example, in the latter’s development of “a rigid 
doctrine of natural rights inherent in individuals independent of social organization,” 
as well as Locke’s privileging “natural law” (metaphysically devised) over “positive 
law” (socially devised).31 In other words, Dewey criticized Locke and others because 
their theories hinged on ethereal and abstract principles, such as natural law, which 
had no social or worldly basis. In addition, Dewey found fault in their developing 
hyper-individualistic theories that not only privileged economic interests, but also 
resulted in what Habermas referred to later as “an anonymous system independent 
of the intentions of unconsciously sociated individuals, a system that followed its 
own logic and subjected society as a whole to the economically decoded imperatives 
of its self-stabilization.” Of utmost importance is the fact that, as a “mechanism of 
social integration,” the “political economy” emerged as “a non-normative one.”32 
Habermas is reemphasizing the same scathing criticism that Dewey made half 
a century earlier with regard to the eclipse of the public. “Till the Great Society,” by 
which Dewey meant individualistic, impersonal, economic society, “is converted into 
a Great Community” that gives priority to collective action, “the Public will remain 
in eclipse,” he demurred. Antonio and Kellner similarly explain one of Habermas’s 
criticisms of the western Enlightenment project as “seeking an Archimedean point” 
that is historically and culturally indefatigable, or in Habermas’s own words, a the-
ory that “start[s] with ‘concrete ideals immanent in traditional forms of life.’” On 
the contrary, Habermas concludes, “the theory of communicative action . . . must 
proceed ‘reconstructively’” and democratically as a function of “social critique.”33 
Furthermore, Dewey voiced concern over the fact that “mass production” 
was not merely “confined to the factory,” but that it had invaded the intimate and 
social spaces that should otherwise exist as venues for collective action. The “Public” 
was “lost,” he complained, and the only way to restore the Public was to democra-
tize communication. It “alone,” he asserted, “can . . . create a great community.”34 
Similarly, in Democracy and Education Dewey writes about the significance of 
intersubjective communication:
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Impulses of communication and habits of intercourse have to be adapted 
to maintaining successful connections with others; a large fund of social 
knowledge accrues. As a part of this intercommunication one learns much 
from others. They tell of their experiences and of the experiences which, 
in turn, have been told them. In so far as one is interested or concerned in 
these communications, their matter becomes a part of one’s own experi-
ence. Active connections with others are such an intimate and vital part of 
our own concerns that it is impossible to draw sharp lines, such as would 
enable us to say, “Here my experience ends; there yours begins.” In so far as 
we are partners in common undertakings, the things which others commu-
nicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in the enterprise 
blend at once into the experience resulting from our own special doings.35
According to Sheldon Wolin, Dewey disparaged the Enlightenment phi-
losophers whose economic theories undermined their simultaneous support for 
the liberalization of politics. In other words, their support for a free market cul-
tivated “a business culture that thwarted the democratic potential of” republican 
institutions. They fused the act of seeking self-interest in the economic realm with 
the political and civic realm. This “reduction of politics to interest,” according to 
Wolin, “has cast a powerful shadow on modern politics,”36 and Dewey was cogni-
zant of this fact during his day. Government was conceived as an arbiter of conflict-
ing individual interests rather than as a political means of facilitating democratic 
communication. Of course, the American Revolution was not intended to secure 
a democratic government, which is why Dewey finds fault with it. “Mobocracy” 
was conflated with democracy, and the founders structured the new constitution 
to delimit democratic possibilities. Political liberty was tempered while freedom 
in the economic realm was left virtually unfettered. 
In 1971, John Rawls similarly reflected upon the rationalities that distin-
guished a liberal market with liberal democracy by asserting, “The theory of com-
petitive markets [is] not moved by the desire to act justly” and to realize “just . . . 
arrangements.” Rather, these “normally require . . . the use of sanctions” in order to 
“stabilize” conflict resulting from “persons who oppose one another as indifferent 
if not hostile powers.” The atomistic and self-interested nature of “private society,” 
including the competitive market that is intended to channel and give life to these 
principles, reminds us that “private society is not held together by a public convic-
tion that its basic arrangements are just and good in themselves, but by the calcu-
lations of everyone . . . pursu[ing] their personal ends.”37 The traditional emphasis 
on negative liberty and individualism has resulted in modern political institutions 
that focus primarily on managing the indifferent and competing interests of pri-
vate individuals and groups. And because political institutions have been infected 
by powerful groups lobbying for private interests, in the same way that increased 
capital can offer advantages in the economic sphere, the public realm has been 
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eclipsed by a market mentality. In this sense, political institutions become mere 
mechanisms for pursuing private benefits, and those persons or corporate bodies 
that possess the greatest capital too often enjoy not just market share, but political 
influence and political benefits.38 Communication has been removed from the great 
mass of citizens, which Dewey describes as the loss of the Public. The “machine-
like . . . relationships” that have emerged from a market ethos and spilled over into 
the social and political spheres have resulted in the objectification of individuals as 
means to achieve self-interested and competitive ends, according to Dewey. These 
relationships, what Habermas subsequently refers to as instrumentally oriented, 
are not “social” ones, but rather embody attempts to control. “Genuine social life,” 
according to Dewey, “is . . . identical with communication,” and when communica-
tion is reserved for select members of a community or group, it is neither “social,” in 
Dewey’s terms, nor “educative.” Agreement “demands communication, and com-
munication must be democratic for agreement to achieve legitimacy.”39 
Interest group politics results in too many policies that fail to meet Dewey’s 
democratic expectations; namely, the notion that public policies should be the result of 
democratic processes that privilege equal and comprehensive communication so that the 
normative agreements generated by this process gain the broadest possible legitimacy 
among those who must live under their results. In Habermasian terms, “A communi-
catively achieved agreement has a rational basis” in that “it cannot be imposed by” any 
of the parties “whether instrumentally through intervention in the situation directly or 
strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents.” Furthermore, “agreement 
can . . . be objectively obtained by force, but what comes to pass manifestly through 
outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively as agreement.”40 
Rather than extensive political oversight of the economy, the market has subverted 
representative government’s potential normative legitimacy. However, unlike Dewey, 
who viewed democracy as an existential activity, Rawls’s liberalism prioritizes “the role 
of administration,” according to Wolin, over participatory democracy. Conceptualiz-
ing the state as an arbiter of competing interests not only results in the encapsulation 
of politics within a market ideology, but it also reduces the citizen and civic virtue to 
instrumental—and goal-oriented—rationalities. Wolin concludes, for example, that 
“The demos has been hammered into resignation, into fearful acceptance of the econ-
omy as the basic reality of its existence, so huge, so sensitive, so ramifying in its conse-
quences that no group, party, or political actors dare alter its fundamental structure.”41 
Hannah Arendt likewise concluded that the constitution’s structure not only 
diminished possibilities for democratic governance, but it also circumvented this 
ideal in favor of a labyrinth-esque framework that largely protected the power of 
external economic and aristocratic interests.42 This is why most democratic gains 
that have been achieved by women, the disabled, African Americans, Hispanics, 
and others have largely occurred through the use of extra-constitutional or uncon-
ventional political means. Without the communicative democracy Dewey strove 
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to justify, individuals “are given up to the service of ends external to themselves.”43 
They are treated as objects that “lose . . . identity as . . . living thing[s].”44 They are 
acted upon rather than acting together for agreed upon ends. The key for achieving 
progress, Dewey believed, lies in social “intercourse and communication of experi-
ence.” In Democracy and Education, for example, he concludes that
A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its mem-
bers on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institu-
tions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so 
far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives 
individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the 
habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder.45
Likewise, Habermas asserts that, “To the extent that the hypothetical dis-
cussion of normative validity claims is institutionalized, the critical potential of 
speech can be brought to bear on existing institutions.” However, instrumentally 
oriented action manifested in the economic sphere has permeated the public sphere 
to such an extent that it has narrowed opportunities to institutionalize civic spaces 
that could otherwise democratically empower intersubjectively determined agree-
ments. “With the legal institutionalization of the monetary medium,” according to 
Habermas, “success-oriented action steered by egocentric calculations of utility,” 
action typical within market systems, “loses its connection to action oriented by 
mutual understanding.”46 Furthermore, according to Habermas,
This strategic action, which is disengaged from the mechanism of reach-
ing understanding and calls for an objectivating attitude even in regard to 
interpersonal relations, is promoted to the model for methodically dealing 
with a scientifically objectivated nature. In the instrumental sphere, purpo-
sive activity gets free of normative restrictions to the extent that it becomes 
linked to flows of information from the scientific system.47
In addition to the instrumentally oriented action prevalent in the economic sphere, 
the social sphere, according to Habermas, has undergone what Weber referred to ear-
lier as “total administration.” Social relationships have become ever more regulated 
by bureaucratic systems and institutionalized legal processes that are void of demo-
cratic communication. In other words, these relationships, whether or not identified 
by recipients receiving public assistance, are “embedded in the context of a life his-
tory and of a concrete form of life” that often gets reduced “to a violent abstraction, 
not merely because it has to be subsumed under the law, but so that it can be dealt 
with administratively.”48 The administrative and legal processes take priority over 
understanding the multifarious complexities of each client, and the latter become 
objectified in the same way that an inanimate object is acted upon as described by 
Dewey in Democracy and Education.49 (1944, 1–5). Similarly, Habermas’s criticism 
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of the welfare state is that its administrative and legal functions take on the same 
kind of instrumental, goal-oriented action embodied in the economic sphere, but for 
different purposes: “‘The process of providing social services takes on a reality of its 
own, nurtured above all by the professional competence of public officials, the frame-
work of administrative action, biographical and current “findings”, the readiness 
and ability to cooperate of the person seeking the service or being subjected to it.’”50 
Dewey criticized this social phenomenon, witnessing its growth following 
the Gilded Age and during the early twentieth century. In the midst of the Great 
Depression, for example, Dewey wrote in The Social Frontier and criticized the imple-
mentation of “compulsory patriotic rites,” required Bible reading in schools, and 
teaching a doctrinaire knowledge of the constitution. “Three [American] states” he 
disparaged made it “a crime” to teach “evolution,” and several more required “loy-
alty oaths” among “students as a condition of graduation.” He was appalled by the 
fact that teachers unions and tenure were under attack, all of which represented an 
atmosphere that he described as “militant” and formulaic.51 These were reactionary 
attempts to impose doctrinaire and self-interested curricula onto the public schools 
in order to reproduce the status quo and allegiance to an imposing dominant culture. 
In Democracy and Education, Dewey clarified this by asserting that an individual’s 
“seeming attention, his docility, his memorizings and reproductions . . . will par-
take of intellectual servility.” Moreover, “such a condition of intellectual subjection 
is needed for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not expected to 
have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority.” 
What Dewey was defining in the early twentieth century was antisocial, and 
therefore, anti-communicative forms of existence and control. Such conditions are 
“not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic,” he concluded.52 The per-
meation of the market’s influence in areas that were once considered to be public 
responsibilities, including schooling, has been so extensive as to relegate civil soci-
ety to a pliable condition that allows it to be molded to serve the former’s demands 
and interests. Contributing to the eclipse of the public and civic realm is the fact 
that the language of economics, which has been so prevalent in our contemporary 
national discourse, appears neutral in the same way that positivism positioned the 
social sciences during the twentieth century. In other words, the laws of supply and 
demand, inflation and interest rates, changes in employment and unemployment 
are often invoked as natural phenomena (i.e., laws) and, therefore, void of ideol-
ogy. Of course, this is inaccurate, but the contemporary ideologies of neoliberalism 
and libertarianism tend to be portrayed as naturally apolitical and amoral market 
mechanisms that are simply the result of uninhibited interest-seeking individuals. 
These ideologies are portrayed as innocuous and free from racist, classist, and sex-
ist intentions or effects because their outcomes are depicted as merely the natural 
outgrowth of an invisible hand, which represents nothing more than the sum of 
society’s properly functioning organic parts. According to Habermas, 
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To the degree that the economic system subjects the life-forms of private 
households and the life conduct of consumers and employees to its impera-
tives, consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of performance, 
and competition gain the force to shape behavior. The communicative 
practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian life-
style; this . . . induced shift to purposive-rational action orientations calls 
forth the reaction of a hedonism freed from the pressures of rationality. 
As the private sphere is undermined and eroded by the economic system, 
so too is the public sphere by the administrative system. The bureaucratic 
disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion- and 
will-formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty and makes 
it easier to uncouple political decision-making from concrete, identity-
forming contexts of life. Insofar as such tendencies establish themselves, we 
get Weber’s (stylized) picture of a legal domination that redefines practical 
questions as technical ones and dismisses demands for substantive justice 
with a legalistic reference to legitimation through procedure.53
Preceding Habermas, Dewey once concluded that “the state,” the political sphere 
that embodies the entire realm of public activity, “was a sum of [all its] units,”54 and 
Honohan more recently declared “civil society” a larger public unit that comprises 
all of its parts including “associations” that “are hierarchical, non-deliberative and 
[that] operate out of the public eye.”55 Dewey (and Habermas after him) developed 
theories that strive for genuine democratic governance. A genuine democracy results 
in policies that are normatively and legitimately authoritative because, as opposed 
to the decisions produced by authoritarian regimes, the decisions and actions of its 
subunits, such as the market, are held accountable to a higher archetype. 
Today, the economy continues to expand its reach into new areas of life—
privatization of military defense, prison services, and public education, to name 
just a few—and this is inverting what should be the predominant authority exer-
cised by a genuine democratic government over its subunits. A government whose 
policies embody the confluence of democratically developed norms of consensus 
has, on the other hand, very different implications than a government whose poli-
cies are implemented as a result of oblique or unscrupulous schemes. Political and 
public decision making should not “be organized like corporate bodies,” according 
to Habermas,56 but Dewey goes farther by arguing that democratic decision mak-
ing should filter into other subunits including, but not limited to, the economy. 
Democracy is prioritized by Dewey in its relation to the market. In fact, Harbermas 
asserts that Dewey, more than any other philosopher, wrote about “‘the essential 
need’ to advance ‘the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persua-
sion.’” It was Dewey’s neopragmatism, and his emphasis on communication, that 
resulted in Habermas drawing the following conclusion about his own discourse 
theory: “the democratic procedure is institutionalized in discourses and bargaining 
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processes by employing forms of communication that promise that all outcomes 
reached in conformity with the procedure are reasonable.” Deliberative democracy 
“is especially meant to be educative, by providing the “‘methods and conditions’ 
of political will-formation that Dewey . . . considered ‘the problem of the public.’”57
In response to the overwhelming influence of the market and industrialization 
during his day, Dewey offered a newly developed reconstructionist approach that 
shifted the focus to fostering a pervasively democratic system of communication 
that could continually renew normatively constructed agreements among citizens 
who were themselves subjected to these agreements. Too many associations in soci-
ety, Dewey argued, “lack . . . [a] reciprocity of interest,” such as is the case when “a 
gang or clique brings its antisocial spirit into relief,” a spirit that embodies “interests 
‘of its own’” and “which shut it out from full interaction with other groups, so that 
its prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has got, instead of reorganization 
and progress through wider relationships.”58 According to Dewey, his “Democratic 
Ideal” required that we acknowledge our interdependence, a “recognition of mutual 
interests as a factor in social control,” and the desire for “continuous readjustment” 
by confronting change with continuous “intercourse.”59 Democracy served as the 
archetype in Dewey’s sociopolitical theory and his educational philosophy. Hierar-
chically speaking, democracy, which requires reflective and ongoing communication, 
is given priority over all other subunits. “A democracy,” Dewey famously asserted
. . . is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated 
living, of conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the 
number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to 
refer his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others 
to give point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down 
of those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from 
perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more 
varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an 
individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation 
in his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed 
as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group 
which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests.60
Learning is, therefore, not simply the act of inculcating in children a society’s tra-
ditional values, norms, and customs, as important as this is. It is an attempt to 
cultivate unknown potentialities in each individual, which cannot be fully known 
unless the individual is freed from the stultifying institutions that privilege indi-
vidualistic ontologies. Individuals must be given opportunities to engage in and 
reconstruct their environment interdependently with fellow social beings, beings 
who vary in multiple respects and therefore contribute multiple perspectives from 
which each can engage with, reflect upon, and act collectively to solve problems. 
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Only by experiencing the widest possible range of a person’s diverse social envi-
ronment through communication with others can he or she break the parameters 
of a limited parochial knowledge and evolve into a higher plane of existence and 
potential, what Dewey refers to as growth. Aaron Schutz summarizes this goal nicely 
when he paraphrases from Dewey’s Democracy and Education that, “democratic 
communities create a tremendous web of conscious interdependence in which 
there are ‘numerous and varied . . . points of shared’ interest that are interpreted 
and acted upon differently by different participants. In this way, ‘the intellectual 
variations of the individual in observation, imagination, judgment, and invention 
. . . can become ‘the agencies of social progress.’”61
dEwEy’s sociopolitical pHilosopHy: a dEmocratic sociEty 
will sHapE possibilitiEs for dEmocratic scHools
Despite relevant concerns over the pragmatic problems that would likely emerge 
in expanding access to deliberations in a multicultural society, as highlighted by 
Heather Voke, democratic schooling is an essential ingredient in Dewey’s philoso-
phy conceived to overcome these difficulties. The rules of speech and communica-
tion vary among cultures, but this is justification for supporting a communicative 
theory rather than an argument opposing it, as with Voke.62 Everyone should have 
their perspectives challenged or critiqued, which is the essence of Dewey’s demo-
cratic and intersubjective theory. How else can we diffuse conflict and implement 
public policies that have been considered from multiple perspectives? Differences 
in perspectives must be brought together, according to Dewey, in order to broaden 
understanding and intellectual horizons in a diverse society. 
Furthermore, Bynum successfully corrects an oversimplified reading of Dewey 
by Cornell West. According to Bynum, West criticizes Dewey’s idealism, arguing 
that the latter’s deliberative democracy is impracticable due to deeply institutional-
ized forms of oppression in the United States. Despite West’s reasonable concern, 
Bynum responds to this criticism by clarifying Dewey’s philosophy: “It is far from 
clear that the future way of life Dewey envisions would” be so limited, “consider-
ing his belief that we must constantly modify social life by chopping away the ‘dead 
wood’ of newly useless traditions as we reshape conjoint social projects in response to 
constant, critical reevaluations of our present experiences’ significance.”63 In response 
to West, Bynum clarifies Dewey’s definition of “the social,” which is elaborated in 
chapter seven of Democracy and Education: It is “not simply anything that goes on 
within a social group, but rather as a particular kind of nonoppressive, mutually 
interested relatedness that enables growth in the range and quality of human experi-
ence.” Accordingly, “Dewey prepares a standard for judging societies,” according to 
Bynum, which adequately addresses West’s criticism, in my opinion.64 Rømer refers 
to Dewey’s idea of growth as “a kind of endless doubling of intelligence,” which “can 
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only take place in an open and democratic society.” Contrarily, “closed groups . . . 
cannot be genuine social groups and, therefore, are unable to offer education in its 
proper sense (they can only offer instruction),” as Rømer explains.65
It is not surprising, for example, that Dewey chose schooling and education as 
parts of his ontological theory, which give priority to the democratic and interdepen-
dent elements of human nature and recognize the necessity of bridging multicultural 
communities through the education of youth. Where better, we might ask, in a society 
absorbed by institutions that otherwise promote instrumental-, strategic-, and utilitar-
ian-oriented rationalities to develop future citizens than in schools that could, if freed 
from these rationalities, inculcate democratic and communicative capabilities in future 
citizens? Democratic schooling, Dewey hoped, would focus on developing the natural 
or instinctual tendency for humans to engage in social communication and reconstruc-
tion in order to cooperatively cohabitate. As a subunit of the state, formal schooling 
represents the broader culture from which it was conceived and for which it is utilized. 
Schooling in modern society is to serve as a conduit for developing in children 
“virtue” or the “means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming 
through association with others in all the offices of life,” Dewey urged.66 It appears 
that Dewey viewed formal schooling as the necessary institutional means for coun-
tering the otherwise negative impact of a cultural ethos that privileged individualistic 
culture buttressed by both political and economic institutions. Dewey viewed these 
institutions as antithetical to the development of human potential, which required 
meaningful associational practices resulting from free and equal communication. 
“All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral,” 
Dewey concluded. “Learning” has “a social aim,” and when it effectively encompasses 
Dewey’s idealized sociality, “the school becomes itself . . . a miniature community.”67
Dewey was one of the first modern theorists to methodically fuse education 
and democracy into a sociopolitical philosophy. Educational philosophers since 
Plato and Aristotle have promoted education as a public good (albeit for different 
purposes), but today, we are witnessing a paradigmatic attack on the idea of the 
public itself as it is consumed by market forces. I agree with Alison Kadlec when she 
concludes that, “Dewey’s notion of experience is intersubjective, communicative, 
and social,” as well as a living through of “the consequences of our actions,” which 
“taken together . . . form the basis of a powerful resource for critical reflection and 
social transformation.”68 Furthermore, Dewey offered a more radical democratic 
communication theory than did Habermas because he sought to extend this nor-
mative process beyond political institutions to include “economic, international, 
educational, scientific . . . artistic, [and] religious”69 institutions. 
Habermas clearly perceived Dewey’s contribution to a pragmatic theory of 
communication when he offered the following conclusion: “No one has worked 
out [an institutionalization of the democratic procedure . . . by employing forms 
of communication . . . that promise reasonable outcomes . . . more energetically 
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than John Dewey.”70 Anticipating Habermas’s communicative action theory, Dewey 
developed a deeply moral philosophy by ontologically locating social action and 
change democratically through communication. This, in my opinion, is Dewey’s 
most formidable accomplishment and one that can be seen throughout his works, 
but, in particular, in Democracy and Education. 
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